Freedom of Religion vs. Big Tech – Religion & Liberty Online

The episode that shook one of the most important voices of the conservative Catholic world in Italy during the summer of 2025—namely the blog Messainlatino.it—remains one of the most eloquent signs of the ethical fragilities afflicting today’s digital ecosystem. The blog was taken offline for twelve days by Google-Blogger under the generic accusation of “hate speech.” It was deprived, without prior notice, of its public space, despite the editors’ attention and care in balancing full conformity of the content with Catholic doctrine and the utmost respect owed to individuals.

The sudden removal—occurring after the publication of a letter by Bishop Strickland against the female diaconate, following a series of reports and amid the already tense climate after the revelations concerning the Summorum Pontificum dossier—highlighted how easily an algorithm can become an instrument of unjust censorship, especially when quantitative judgment prevails over the assessment of facts. europeanconservative.com covered the matter here.

Today, however, the scenario has changed. After three months of legal battle, the site’s curators fully prevailed in court: Google was found responsible for violating the editors’ freedom of expression and religion, and has been condemned to pay legal expenses, thus opening a new chapter in the protection of confessional content online. This victory not only restores honor to a voice faithful to Catholic tradition, but also marks the beginning of broader developments, destined to affect the relationship between digital platforms and Christian communities that wish to serve the truth with frankness.

It must not be forgotten that the case of MiL is not an exception, nor a marginal quarrel born of a dubious post, but rather the symptom of a broader flaw in a censorial system entirely delegated to an algorithm by a Big Tech company, almost by definition depersonalized. It is no coincidence that this unjust censorship was denounced both at the national level, through a parliamentary question by Italian MP Maddalena Morgante, and at the European level, through a similar question by Italian MEP Paolo Inselvini.

That said, as stated by the public face of the blog in question, Luigi Casalini, in a recent interview, the MiL case is destined to set a precedent. Several specialized journals have already requested to study and thoroughly analyze the legal proceedings in order to draw conclusions useful both for scholars of digital governance and (perhaps above all) for legislators.

The case was first and foremost configured as a significant procedural violation within the framework of the DSA, the new European regulation on digital services. The shutdown of the blog, which occurred on July 11, 2025, was carried out without any specific justification, in clear contrast with the notice-and-action obligation established by European law. According to this provision, any decision to restrict or remove online content—whether following user reports or algorithmic detection—must be communicated to the affected user with clear and precise reasons, as well as with the possibility of appeal.

In this case, Google did not specify the contested content, did not initiate a human review process, and delegated the entire decision to an algorithm, as evidenced by the unsigned email received by the site’s administrators. This element represents the most evident point of friction with the principles of transparency and accountability that the European Union seeks to impose on what are commonly referred to as VLOPs—Very Large Online Platforms.

Added to this was the difficulty encountered by the editors in finding a competent territorial contact—between Italy, Ireland, and the United States—which further highlighted the current shortcomings of the European architecture of “digital sovereignty,” still unable to ensure effective and immediate interlocution between users and major extra-European operators.

The ruling of the Italian court, which sided with the blog, should mark a turning point for the proper understanding of freedom of expression and freedom of religion in today’s world of algorithmic digital moderation. The judge, in fact, reaffirmed the primacy of the fundamental right to freely express one’s thought over automated decisions lacking justification, recognizing that a censorial intervention without a precise indication of the contested content cannot be considered compliant either with the DSA or with the general principles of the European legal order.

The immediate reinstatement of the blog constitutes an exemplary application of the principle of proportionality: when a restrictive measure is adopted without an adequate factual basis, the remedy must be full, prompt, and not conditioned by opaque internal procedures. The order imposed on Google to cover legal expenses underscores that the responsibility of the provider is not merely technical, but also legal and institutional: platforms, especially when designated as VLOPs, are concretely accountable for the effects of their choices on the European public sphere. It must not be forgotten, in fact, that such algorithmic errors could, in other circumstances, cause significant economic damage.

The impersonality of major digital operators generates a vacuum of responsibility that translates into a direct tension with the fundamental rights enshrined by the European Union. In our case, the censorship was triggered—at least according to what Google clarified during the trial—by a combination of factors: coordinated reports from hostile users, an algorithm incapable of distinguishing between religious doctrine and incitement to hatred, and an automatic interpretation of terms which, outside their cultural context, even before their textual one, can prove misleading.

This episode clearly highlights how the boundary between private moderation and European public norms remains legally fragile today, leaving room for arbitrary interventions that can directly affect freedom of expression and religion.

The MiL case underscores the urgent need for European and national legislators to clearly define the limits of religious hate speech. Who today holds the formal authority to determine what constitutes hate speech in Europe? It is evident that Europe must initiate a process of regulatory standardization, capable of precisely delimiting the boundary between doctrinal teaching—which includes the right to reasoned critique of others’ positions—and verbal or written expression that is unjust because it harms individual dignity and honorability, thereby safeguarding religious freedom without weakening protection against genuine hate speech.

If the MiL case is not interpreted for what it truly represents—a critical test of digital sovereignty and the protection of religious freedom—the risk will not only be the censorship of individual content but the establishment of a dangerous precedent, in which anonymous algorithms become the uncontested arbiters of fundamental rights in Europe.

(This essay originally appeared on euroconservative.com on November 19, 2025, and is republished here with permission.)